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Introduction
Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Georgian Orthodox Church 
was simultaneously exposed to both modernization and social conservatism. 
The Church became a refuge for conservative ideology, sending clear messages 
of de-modernization reminiscent of church-state relations during the Russian 
Empire. Many other post-Communist countries were in a similar situation1. 
Increased social role of the Church in post-Soviet Georgia can be ex-
plained via the concept of ideological vacuum2, which is also helpful for un-
derstanding religion in Eastern Europe3. It suggests that dissolution of the 
Soviet Union created a problem of self-definition along with other socio-po-
litical challenges. If before it was possible to discuss Georgian identity and 
nationalism in Marxist-Leninist terms, at least formally, discreditation of the 
latter created the need of a new Georgian national ideology imbued with re-
ligious ethos. 
The concept of ideological vacuum, similar to religious market theory, 
implies that our ideological needs, whether political or transcendental, are in 
a constant flux. If combined with religious market hypothesis, the theory could 
suggest that individual choices in favor of certain religions are determined 
by the level of competition between institutions and organizations profess-
ing the given ideology. 
In Georgia, choice was made between two elements of national iden-
tity — religion and ethnicity. Whether Georgia had the option to prioritize 
civic nationalism is a subject of debate since situation was similar in the whole 
region, where religion and ethnicity became new dominant elements of iden-
tity. Failure of civic nationalism, further aggravated by cynical disposition to-
wards the state, can account for the lack of competition between state insti-
tutions on the ideological market. Social cynicism originated from the Soviet 
times — the great majority of Georgians are accustomed to viewing politics as 
dirty and fake. In practice, this attitude was revealed in refusal to cooperate 
with law-enforcement agencies and choosing criminals as mediators instead. 
After the declaration of independence, political parties with radical 
nationalist rhetoric soon managed to discredit themselves due to civil and 
ethnic confrontations, and their inability to establish an effective political 
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system. As a result, the Georgian Orthodox Church emerged as an actor on 
Georgian ideological market. Trust in the Church compensated for the lack 
of trust in state institutions. 
From a secondary institution, the Georgian Orthodox Church soon 
turned into a spiritual and cultural leader of the nation, and without damag-
ing Universalist nature of religion, continues to have a strong, but unpropor-
tional, relationship with ethnicity. According to the Church, being an Ortho-
dox Christian does not translate into being a Georgian, but being a Geor-
gian equals to being an Orthodox Christian. Along with preserving religious 
Universalism, which is a central trait of monotheistic faiths, this doctrine of 
Georgian nationalist identity is based on religious culture hypothesis, which 
suggests that dominant religious faith in any nation leaves a deep mark on 
culture and society. Accordingly, as demonstrated by the position of clergy, a 
socialized human in Georgian cultural setting, even an atheist, is still an Or-
thodox Christian to some extent. 
Starting from the 1990’s the Georgian Orthodox Church was the only 
organization that could ideologically unify the society and provide services. 
However, its intolerance towards modernization, the West, sects and sexual 
minorities remains a hindrance in the formation of a liberal civil society in 
Georgia4. Stronger state institutions and increased public trust in their effi-
ciency, which became possible only after 15 years of independence, generated 
a new civil discourse of the political elite alongside with traditional ethnic-
nationalist discourse of the Church. Despite significant legislative changes, 
the Georgian Orthodox Church preserved its monopoly over public opinion, 
which would have been impossible without state support. 
Religion in Liberal Democracy
Theoretical framework for analyzing social outcomes of the Church’s 
teachings needs to originate from academic discussions on the compatibility 
of religion and liberal democracy. This discourse acquires an especially prag-
matic value when secularization theory, discussed in parallel with moderniza-
tion, loses its credence owing to increased socio-political function of religion 
around the world. It could even be argued that the world is more religious 
today than it has ever been5. For traditional countries like Georgia, dynamics 
between religion and political ideology are more important than for coun-
tries with a stable, consolidated political system. Traditional countries need to 
balance different social forces, which is an individual process for each society 
and cannot be learned from one model. 
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Jaspers provides four major characteristics of modernity: contempo-
rary science and technology, strive for independence, globalization and most 
importantly, emergence of mass movements (nationalism, democracy, social-
ism, social movements)6. A modern state can be characterized by high level 
of civil involvement in politics. It is a political system where state institutions 
mediate between social forces (religious, ethnic, class) and regulate them with 
general political rules7. Acquisition of individual rights and the right to par-
ticipate in politics is an important instrument for any social group since it 
provides the means to effectively partake in generation and utilization of so-
cial resources8. 
In every society there are groups with limited participation. In liber-
al-democratic countries, such groups include children, prisoners and illegal 
immigrants. However, if we look at the history of western European liberal-
democratic countries and the USA, the number of groups with limited rights 
of participation is much higher. It was not long ago when different religious, 
ethnic, and race groups, low social classes, sexual minorities and women were 
allowed limited political participation. Modernization of a political system 
implies socio-political activity and, more generally speaking, intensive social 
involvement in utilization of social resources. 
There is a modern tendency of diminishing religious motives and weak-
ened church influence9. Scholars studying modernization refer to this pro-
cess as secularization. One of the central hypotheses of this theory is a shift 
in basic ethical values as a result of political, social and economic changes, 
which in turn precipitates sacralization of the profane or institutionalization 
of the sacral10. Exchange of attributes between religious and national ideas 
is the most prominent transformation. If previously government was legiti-
mized by God, nation became the primary source of legitimization and the 
main sovereign in modernity11. If people defended their faith in the holy wars 
of the past, now nation, which is also immortal and eternal, became the rea-
son of self-sacrifice. Modernity discovered secular equivalents of traditional 
sacred values12. 
If we discuss religion from the perspective of political participation, we 
could argue that secularization specific to Western modernity, is one of the 
preconditions for increased political participation. Politically influential Uni-
versalist religion sets certain ideological restrictions on the political participa-
tion of its lower class parish, as well as women. Moreover, representatives of 
other faiths are perceived as deficient members of the state since due to their 
religious affiliation they are not equal before the law. In consequence of van-
ishing religious influence and privatization of religious experience through 
the process of secularization, important socio-political issues are subjected to 
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rational rather than theological analysis, which favors social consensus and 
pluralism based on its pragmatic-utilitarian-liberal13. 
Freedom of faith is one of the fundamental values of liberal democracy 
since the burden of judgment makes consensus between individuals in tran-
scendental and metaphysical questions impossible. Subsequently, there is a vi-
tal intrinsic link between pluralization and liberal democracy, since the latter 
is a type of state where citizens have the right to chose their religious, moral 
and metaphysical convictions14. If religious pluralism has a positive impact 
on the level of religiosity, as proved by religious market theory, it certainly be-
comes a threat to a monopolist church. 
Modernization as a new core civilization has a diverse impact on reli-
gion. Yves Lambert categorizes modernity’s influence on religion into four 
types: fall, adaptation and reinterpretation, conservative reaction, and inno-
vation15. From these four, only the first is directly linked with secularization; 
adaptation-reinterpretation and innovation are only related to it if they imply 
severance from conservative religious authorities; conservative reaction works 
against secularization since it entails fortification of religion and religious au-
thority at the expense of pluralism and tolerance16. 
Religiosity does not pose a threat to liberal culture when religious orga-
nizations are part of a pluralist society, as in the United States. Religious dy-
namics of the United States are most convincingly explained by religious mar-
ket theory, which links high level of religiosity to pluralism and strong compe-
tition between religious organizations17. There have been academic attempts 
in political philosophy to unite liberalism and religion in order to prove that 
a person with religious values can have liberal opinions and be politically ac-
tive without prohibiting the same for others18. 
However, due to the nature and extent of religiosity in Georgia, it is 
impossible to start a conversation on the cohabitation of religion and liber-
alism. Georgian religious domain is monopolized by one church, which per-
ceives this monopoly as a precondition and indicator of its own strength. 
Religious pluralism represents a threat not only for the Orthodox Church, 
but also for the society whose values and culture are sheltered by the Church. 
Monopolist religious organizations in post-Soviet dominion act according to 
religious market theory19, which implies posing legislative obstacles to rival re-
ligious organizations via governmental assistance, and creating privileges for 
themselves. Public support for these laws is founded on the claim that sec-
tarian, non-Georgian teachings are detrimental to the country’s culture, and 
accordingly, political freedom. It is paradoxical that apart from the 1920’s and 
1930’s, Soviet government appealed to similar politics in order to secure the 
monopoly of scientific atheism. 
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Religious Dynamics of Post-Soviet Georgia
Soviet modernization project was aimed at complete eradication, rather 
than weakening, of the role of religion. During certain periods, war on reli-
gion was implemented through forceful means — churches were closed and 
demolished, priesthood repressed, anti-religious magazines and newspapers 
were published. Religious “prejudices” had to be replaced by a truthful and 
materialistic vision of the universe advocated by scientific atheism, which in-
corporated belief in Marxist-Leninist interpretation of history20. Neverthe-
less, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, almost every post-Soviet coun-
try established the same religious monopoly as before21. 
In independent Georgia, political parties with radical nationalist rheto-
ric soon discredited themselves owing to civil and ethnic confrontations and 
their incapacity to establish an effective political system. As characteristic to 
many post-Soviet countries, Georgian nation was consolidated around the 
Church22. Orthodox Christianity became an invaluable element of national 
identity and an ethnic delineator. There is an asymmetrical relationship be-
tween Georgian ethnicity and Orthodox Christianity: being an Orthodox 
Christian does make one a Georgian, but being a Georgian implies being an 
Orthodox Christian. 
Due to high-level of mistrust in governmental institutions and cynical 
attitude to public domain, no organization professing national idea proved 
competitive during the early stages of independence. Tolerated for 70 years, 
the Church did not possess any experience in tolerance. After gaining mo-
nopoly over religious domain and acquiring major social functions, it turned 
into an obstacle for modernization. 
Georgians associate modernization with high-quality life of Western 
societies, stable political and economic systems, and effective state institu-
tions. In addition to institutional modernization, ideological changes are also 
considered. Since Soviet totalitarian-atheistic yoke was opposed due to its 
detrimental effect on Georgian soul and independence, Georgian soul needs 
to be defined in Tocquevillian liberal terminology. Yet the Church emerged 
as the primary advocate of anti-Western sentiments in society; paradoxically, 
it is one of the institutions that incurred greatest losses during the Soviet to-
talitarian regime. 
Complex challenges of the modernization project aimed at the integra-
tion into Western structures can be divided in two parts. First is the Church’s 
attitude towards certain groups and organizations, limiting their socio-politi-
cal activities. Disposition of the Church towards sects and sectarians, women 
and sexual minorities, and non-Orthodox Georgians presents these groups 
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as deficient members of society to those who value the Church’s teachings. 
The second problem is an alternative project of modernization derived from 
the Georgian Orthodox Church. One significant illustration of this project 
is the idea of monarchy so popular among priesthood. The conviction that 
modernization is possible through preserving Georgian traditions cultivated 
by the Church is principally correct, but often aimed at thwarting, rather than 
guiding, the process. 
Alternative project of modernization proposed by the Church falls into 
the theoretical framework of multiple modernities. Modernity here is per-
ceived as a new core civilization, with the West as the initiator of structural 
differentiation of social fields in numerous societies. These processes, how-
ever, were implemented in multiple contexts, giving birth to different insti-
tutional and ideological models of modernization. The models are modern, 
but simultaneously influenced by traditional cultures. Depending on their 
cultural-ideological traits, cultures favor different approaches when solving 
problems associated with modernity. This generates an illusion of confronta-
tion with modernity. In some circumstances, certain socio-intellectual move-
ments might present themselves as “post-modern” or “anti-globalist”, and re-
ligious organizations can proclaim themselves as fundamentalist in order to 
deal with modernity-related issues. This, however, does not mean that they 
have transgressed the boundaries of modernity23. 
The government-led modernization project in Georgia proposes close 
ties with the West, integration into NATO and EU structures, and participa-
tion in global politico-cultural and economic affairs as a solution to the coun-
try’s problems. This is a classical Western project of modernization, which 
suggests that Western cultural program of modernity and its major adminis-
trative institutions will eventually spread throughout the modern world. The 
Georgian Orthodox Church, on the other hand, presents Western “soulless” 
humanistic culture as the main menace for Georgia. 
Both, the Church and the state, emphasize the same problem, which 
can be defined as the national ideology program. Its foremost goal is politi-
co-cultural sovereignty. However, the Church considers Western-style insti-
tutional development proposed by the state as the primary source of trouble. 
Nevertheless, the Church also highlights national-modern ideology as a cen-
tral problem.
The political project of Georgian modernization is aimed at the preser-
vation of plurality of social groups, ideologies and lifestyles, which is possible 
through human rights and supremacy of the law. For the religious project of 
modernization, on the other hand, social pluralism represents a challenge for 
the “true” order. Instead, maximum homogenization is advocated, which can 
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only be accomplished through the subordination of different groups. This sys-
tem of subordination is controlled by a Georgian Orthodox male — women 
have to submit to his orders, non-Orthodox Christians will not achieve sal-
vation, and sexual minorities do not possess any rights. As Father Elizbar 
(Kashueti Church) noted, “Georgian gays do not exist”, and thus, they need to 
be assigned a separate territory. 
Georgianness and Orthodox Christianity 
As noted before, the Georgian Orthodox Church subordinates Geor-
gian nationality to Orthodox Christianity. The majority of priesthood de-
fines Georgian nationality in terms of Orthodox Christianity. The latter has 
so deeply infiltrated Georgian culture that a socialized individual, even a 
representative of other religions, still thinks in terms of Orthodox Christian 
categories. Distinguished Georgians who were not Orthodox Christians are 
deemed worthy only thanks this perspective. 
Only one priest drew a line between Georgian nationality and Ortho-
dox Christianity. According to his argument: “Christ does not distinguish be-
tween ethnicities and nations. In the Church of Christ there are no ethnic differ-
ences, because Christ does not differentiate between those who recognize and believe 
in his truth” (Archpriest Basil, Batumi)24. In contrast to this, there are radical 
arguments supporting the union of nationalism and theology, which equate 
Georgian nationality with Orthodox Christianity because: “creation of ethnic-
ities was God’s will. Thus, whatever relationship exists between Georgian nation 
and Orthodox Christianity — is also present between other nations and Ortho-
dox Christianity. In my opinion, being a human should mean being an Orthodox 
Christian and I believe that Orthodox Christianity is the only true religion and 
the sole service of God” (Archpriest Mirian, Lanchkhuti)25. 
Consequently, Georgian nationality and Georgian citizenship entails 
loyalty to Orthodox culture, which prevents not only religious pluralism, but 
also cultural rights. Amalgamation of religion and culture, with the implica-
tion that the former gave rise to the latter, generates overall intolerance. Ex-
amples include: hostility towards ideologically liberal non-governmental or-
ganizations and funds financed by the West — Soros Foundation and Free-
dom Institute being the most oppressed institutions; offended religious feel-
ings after the publication of Georgian translation of Da Vinci Code and Said-
umlo Siroba; the raid of a Halloween party and the turmoil associated with 




Wide support for monarchy by Georgian priesthood is challenging to 
analyze since such political change is planned for the future due to the lack 
of public readiness. Moreover, it is clear that the clergy has only a vague idea 
about the nature of monarchy in Georgia, distribution of responsibilities be-
tween state institutions and the role of the Church. As a result, practical rea-
sons for this position should be discussed in a speculative mode. 
Potential practical motivations could be that: a) the first two presidents 
of independent Georgia revealed their powerlessness, precipitating skeptical 
attitude towards the presidential post among the opposition; b) stronger state 
during the leadership of the third president limited ideological monopoly of 
the Church, and reinforced anti-presidential feelings among the opposition. 
New alternatives to presidential leadership were revealed: 1) parliamentary 
government — proposed by the Georgian Republican Party; and 2) parlia-
mentary monarchy — recommended by the New Rights. As suggested by the 
study, the latter is also favored by clergy, probably due to its capacity to aug-
ment the Church’s position. 
Theoretical arguments in favor of monarchy proposed by priesthood 
can be divided in two groups: first is the psychological profile of a powerful 
human and a sovereign, which best corresponds to the image of a king; sec-
ond, and more important for us, is a rhetorical argument: “… king is twice 
anointed, and as a priest, I naturally favor a monarch” (Archpriest M., Lanch-
khuti)26. Similarly, the function of the Georgian Orthodox Church is ex-
plained with reference to the Byzantine Empire. It is obvious that from a po-
litical perspective, the priesthood finds it easier to justify its loyalty towards a 
God-appointed ruler than a public-elected representative. 
Religious Monopoly 
The priesthood deems the state culpable for restricted the Church’s mo-
nopoly, a position evident in their reactions to granting the status of judicial 
entity to religious organizations: “we were exposed to this and it was a very bad 
thing” (Archpriest Mirian, Lanchkhuti)27; “there is an agreement between the 
state and the Church — a Concordat — and it needs to be guarded; if we are build-
ing a state and if we require precision from the Church, the same should be required 
from the state. There was a clear violation of the Concordat by the state since it hap-
pened without any regard for the Church” (Archpriest Basil, Batumi)28. 
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The priesthood has a fairly vague knowledge of the dangers associat-
ed with this law: “naturally, there will probably be increased risks, I don’t know” 
(Archpriest Benjamin, Kvareli); “now they will start complaining: Armenians, 
Catholics, and many others. They will demand things, let’s say churches, or other 
things” (Archimandrite Grigol, Ude). Archpriest Andria substantiates his po-
sition with specific examples and provides two main reasons: “I don’t perceive 
it as dangerous; the only problem is the relationship with Armenians. Last week, 
before it was introduced (legislation granting the status of judicial entity to reli-
gious organizations — author’s note) Armenians did not take our side over the is-
sue of Abkhazia in the UN. When discussing rights, it needs to be considered, that 
all these faiths have their care-takers abroad. This care-taker is money, and more 
freedom to act”29. 
Conclusions
Modernization process in the West continues to generate movements 
demanding full involvement in social life. The goal of these groups is to be-
come rightful subjects under the law and human rights, and to annihilate 
negative stereotypes associated with them. Subsequently, social movements 
are aimed not only towards the political acknowledgement of their rights, but 
also an increased sense of value in the eyes of other social groups. The dispo-
sition of the majority largely determines not only the level of political par-
ticipation, but also self-evaluation of these groups30. 
In post-Soviet Georgia, ethnically determined conflicts that could po-
tentially engender social movements in a liberal-political environment, devel-
oped into full-blown wars and ethnic cleansing in Abkhazia and South Osse-
tia. Instead of liberal ideology, the majority of existent social movements and 
unions are founded on Christian-Conservative ideals. Rather than offering 
rights to certain groups, they intend to preserve current limitations. 
The priesthood regards tolerance as an intrinsic trait of Georgian cul-
ture, ensuring the co-existence of numerous groups throughout history: “well, 
we are not even talking about the U.S.; we all know its history. However … when 
people were burnt at stakes during the ferocious inquisition of twelfth century Eu-
rope, capital punishment was abolished in Georgia. Which values are we talking 
about, then?! Which values can the Europeans teach us?! There is something good 
that we could learn from them, but I think that they should learn more from us” 
(Archpriest Mirian, Lanchkhuti)31. “… We were always tolerant, and during 
each period of Georgian history there were other ethnicities that lived peacefully 
with us, and no one would even consider stripping the Orthodox Church of its sta-
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tus as state religion” (Archpriest Benjamin, Kvareli). It is not worth mention-
ing that tolerance does not correspond to liberal democracy. It resembles the 
Russian imperial policy towards religious minorities, which granted freedom 
of religion to every individual, as long as they remained loyal to the emperor32.
As noted above, the Georgian Orthodox Church aggravates conflicts 
between social groups. Similar conflicts are characteristic to other societies 
and to some extent they are always determined by deficient distribution of so-
cial resources. Distribution of resources becomes an issue due to their limited 
nature and an inclination to restrict resources and rights of other groups33. 
The paradox of this restriction policy is the fact that more social groups in-
volved in active social life allow accumulation of more resources. 
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